individual preferences or production techniques are not given, but gradually take shape through individual action, experience and learning as well as under the influence of institutions and collective norms or beliefs.
Second, from a methodological perspective, the Austrian tradition is associated with the subjectivist viewpoint that it develops. This implies that, though often on a rather diverging basis according to the author considered, a fundamental heterogeneity in individuals is assumed. The answers to those questions vary substantially among Austrian authors. To give only two polar cases, Mises, who endorses an apriorist approach, considers that knowledge consists of a priori logical categories such as causality and that human action is always intentional, rational and conscious, although he views history and law as playing some role in the determination of individual action (Mises [1949] 1996): p. 'human action but not human design' reminds us -even if, both the methodological background and the conception of knowledge of the author considered again reflect on the way he views institutions and their role in economic and social activity.
In this paper, we will focus on two authors: the founding father of the Austrian School, Carl Menger, and one of his direct successors, Friedrich von Wieser, who are emblematic of the way Austrian deals with the problems of knowledge and coordination. More particularly, we will contrast their respective conceptions of knowledge (and beliefs) in relation to the role of institutions. We will stress that, starting from a rather similar methodological background and being interested in solving questions such as how institutions emerge in an environment characterized by individuals' heterogeneity, time and spatial constraints, they however provide divergent perspectives of institutional dynamics.
Before entering into the details of their respective contributions to this field of analysis, let us make some general comments.
First, Menger and Wieser share the view that economic institutions are the product of individual action and not necessarily of human design. In other terms, they are interested in the self-regulating or spontaneous order properties of economic institutions or collective entities while, at the same time, they cannot conceive them as not resulting from the interactions between individual agents, in compliance with the principle of methodological individualism. The process of emergence of institutions must therefore be explained from the perspective of heterogenous individual agents. It follows that assumptions concerning the nature of individual (or inter-individual) knowledge, the way it is transmitted from one individual to the other, and how it evolves through time, are determining to a large extent the role and the properties of institutions. In the following, we endeavour to contrast Menger and Wieser's respective conceptions of institutions from this angle.
Second, they both refer, even if implicitly, to two kinds of knowledge (or belief), namely, individual knowledge (or belief), on the one hand, and collective knowledge (or beliefs) on the other hand. As we will show, the articulation between these two kinds of knowledge appears to be essential in order to analyse such phenomena as the emergence or the maintenance of institutions as well as institutional change.
However, Menger and Wieser do not perceive institutions the same way, the former being more focused on the problem of emergence of institutions, the latter being more interested in the problem of institutional change in relation to the forces of power. In another passage of his Principles, Menger explicitly endorses this vision by writing that "the quantities of consumption goods at human disposal are limited only by the extent of human knowledge of the causal connections between things, and by the extent of human, control over these things" (Menger [1871 (Menger [ ] 1979 . In this quotation, knowledge is conceived as general knowledge that is likely to expand with economic development. Menger indeed considers that any satisfaction of human needs begins from acquiring knowledge. For him, the driving force of economic life lies in gaining knowledge about relevant situations on a twofold basis. On the one hand, agents must know what their economic objectives are, i.e., their economic needs and how those ends can be achieved through time given the time-consuming nature of economic processes: "clarity about the objective of their endeavour is an essential factor in the success of every activity of men" and moreover, "it is also certain that knowledge of requirements for goods in future periods is the first prerequisite for the planning of all human activity directed to the satisfaction of need". On the other hand, given any definite objective, people must know which are the means available to them in order to achieve their objectives: "the second factor that determines the success of human activity is the knowledge gained by men of the means available to them for the attainment of the desired ends" (Menger [1871] 1979, p. 74).
Menger: the role of knowledge in the emergence of institutions
Those two directions of knowledge growth permit to define the usefulness of things, i.e., individuals' knowledge of the causal relationship between means and ends. This kind of knowledge can be illustrated by Menger's reference, borrowed from Aristotle, to "imaginary goods" as a counterexample. Menger indeed defines those imaginary goods as things "that are incapable of being placed in any kind of causal connection with the satisfaction of human needs [but] are nevertheless treated by men as goods" (Menger [1871 (Menger [ ] 1979 . For Menger, this situation arises "when attributes, and therefore capacities, are erroneously ascribed to things that do not really possess them" or "when non-existent human needs are mistakenly assumed to exist" (ibid A second question arises about individuals' rationality: to which extent people can connect means and ends given the time constraints and the uncertainty that characterises economic activity? Clearly, for Menger, the correct foresight of the quantities available for the satisfaction of intended needs is unrealistic, so that "in practical life (…) men customary do not even attempt to obtain results as fully exact as is possible in the existing state of the arts of measuring and taking inventory, but are satisfied with just the degree of exactness that is necessary for practical purposes" (ibid. p. 90).
More generally, knowledge of causalities between means and ends is a principle that guides economic activity as a whole and therefore, must not be understood as restricted to exchange analysis. First, Menger's theoretical framework is based on the idea of the temporal antecedence of the production activity over that of exchange. Second, as wellknown, he provided a microanalysis of the production structure defined as a temporal process characterized by vertical relations between different goods. The vertical hierarchy of goods or, in Menger's terms, the order of the respective goods involved in the productive process is defined according to the degree of closeness of the good to the final stage of consumption. In terms of causal relations, this means that the basic direct causality between means and ends of one consumer does not differ in nature from the causality between productive goods of different orders within the production structure of one producer, but only in degree: the more remote in the production structure the good is the more indirect the causality is. Moreover, the value of remote goods is derived from the value of the final consumer goods they contribute to produce.
As Menger notes, this perspective challenges Adam Smith's conception of economic progress based on the principle of increasing division of labor. For Menger, it is clear that the increase in the volume of consumption goods going with economic progress is not the exclusive effect of the division of labor, but should also be imputed to an increased variety of kinds of economic goods, and as a corollary, to an increased knowledge of the causal relationships between means and ends, which requires an increased knowledge of the already mentioned dual-purpose knowledge (knowledge of the ends / knowledge of the means) but now extended due to time constraints: the knowledge of the "quantity of goods they will need to satisfy their needs during the time period over which their plans extend" and the knowledge of "the quantities of goods at their disposal for the purpose of meeting those requirements" (ibid p. 80) This is only in this sense that it is possible to understand Menger's sentence "the quantities of consumption goods at human disposal are limited only by the extent of human knowledge of the causal connections between things (…)" (Menger [1871] 1979, p. 74).
But as already noticed this knowledge cannot, by nature, be complete: "error is inseparable from knowledge" (ibid, p. 148). With the extension of the production structure and the strengthening of time constraints, perfect foresight is an even less realistic assumption. Indeed, Menger saw the roots of uncertainty in the time-consuming nature of economic processes. Assuming that all production takes time, producers have no way of knowing for certain that the market conditions prevailing when the production is ready for delivery. The result is that price of the finished product bears no resemblance to the costs of production, since the two represent market conditions at very different points on time. To a certain extent, one could say that the principle of increasing knowledge goes hand in hand with a principle of increasing uncertainty.
Moreover, the increasing number of kinds of goods raises the problem of factor complementarity and substitutability.
Let us now envisage how Menger deals with these two issues.
As economic development proceeds, some individuals specialized in the acquisition of knowledge emerge. It is the case, for instance, of merchants, industrialists, who act as middlemen between "members of the society with whom they maintain trading connections" (ibid). With the passing of time, such middlemen constitute a class in its own right: they are "a special class of economizing individuals who take care of the intellectual and mechanical parts of exchange operations for society and who are reimbursed for this with a part of the gains for trade" (ibid. p. 239). These middlemen are referred to by Menger when he discusses the passage from the "isolated household"
to the "organized economy" involving a transitory state of organization corresponding to the system of production on order (Menger [1871] 1976, see Arena and GloriaPalermo 2001, p. 137-38) . From this perspective, economic development can be seen as a process of division of knowledge -a principle that will be later systematized by Hayek, though from a different methodological perspective. This naturally leads
Menger to elaborate further upon the role of organization and institutions with respect to the problem of knowledge. However, he is not very wordy concerning the conditions in terms of knowledge (explicit or tacit knowledge 7 , heterogeneity in agents' cognitive capabilities) for those organizations to emerge, to be maintained or to be efficient.
There is in Menger's writing evidence that those middlemen, who arise with the development of the market, are more aware of the deficiencies of the previous organization of markets or have a better knowledge of their personal interest, which leads to improve the efficiency of exchanges. But this does not imply that those intermediaries do possess a distinctive kind of knowledge, such as practical knowledge that would be associated to their intermediation activity. More convincingly, what
Menger puts forward is that they display a different kind of rationality, in the sense that they act as innovators or as leaders (see Arena and Gloria-Palermo 2001, p. 138) . This assumption of a fragmented population made of leaders and followers is also implicit in
Menger's description of the emergence of money as we shall show.
Concerning the problem of factor complementarity and substitutability, Menger emphasizes the principle of complementarity between goods of different orders, which he states as follows: "We can bring quantities of goods of higher order to the production of given quantities of goods of lower order, and thus finally to the meetings of our requirements, only if we are in the position of having the complementary quantities of other goods of higher order simultaneously at our disposal" (ibid, p. 85, italics in the original). Although this passage stresses the intertemporal complementarity constraint, it however does not prevent factor substitutability to occur provided this constraint is met.
This suggests that the specialization / adaptability dilemma, borrowed from Richardson (1990) 8 , does not necessarily apply to Menger's analysis. As Lachmann puts it, the argument rests on the idea that factor complementarity and substituability do not represent two mutually exclusive alternatives, but "are phenomena belonging to different provinces of the realm of action" (Lachmann 1977, p. 200) . While the notion of factor complementarity applies to capital goods utilized in the prospect of a joint output, the idea of substitutability "is a phenomenon of change, the need for which arises whenever something has gone wrong with a prior plan" (ibid). Nevertheless, this argument does not preclude the lack of precision of Menger regarding organisational implications of both time constraints and uncertainty 9 .
This weakness also reflects on the problem of knowledge. As we have stressed before, Menger's explanation of successive stages of productive organization in terms of time and space constraints stands at a very general and abstract level of analysis. In retrospect on can consider that Menger paved the way for a vast research field of research on capital theory, industrial organization and the role of knowledge in economic activity. Nevertheless, within the Austrian tradition, the road that will be followed focuses more on the prominent role of entrepreneurship than on the firm seen as an economic and social device for managing productive constraints. Kirzner's contribution, judging from his insistence on the awareness of the entrepreneur, provides a striking example of this tendency.
From a different perspective, Menger's emphasis on time constraints and limits to human knowledge also brings up the issue of learning and its place in economic life.
Menger's analysis of the emergence of money provides a good illustration of the importance of learning in economic phenomena and, in particular, in the emergence of the specific institution of money. The case of the emergence of money is also typical of how Menger viewed the problem of emergence of organic -as opposed to pragmaticinstitutions in his Untersuchungen 10 :
"How can it be that institutions which serve the common welfare and are extremely significant for its development come into being without a common will directed toward establishing them?" (Menger [1883 (Menger [ ] 1963 In his discussion of the origins of money (Menger 1892 , Menger [1871 ] 1979 , chapters 7 and 8, Menger [1883 1963, Book 3, chapter 2), Menger points out that individuals do not always get what they want using the barter system. It is both costly and time-consuming to find the exact match, identified by Jevons as the 'doublecoincidence problem' between individual needs. They tend to abandon direct exchange and exchange their goods with more marketable ones. The causes of marketabilityalso referred as saleableness or saleability 11 -in commodities is related, according to Menger, to different circumstances: to the organization of supply and demand (number of buyers, intensity of their needs, importance of their purchasing power, available quantity of the commodity), to the inner characteristics of goods (divisibility for instance) and to the organization of the market (degree of development of exchanges, of speculation and of free trade). Furthermore the saleableness of commodities is also conditioned by spatial limits (degree of transportability, degree of development of the means of transport, commerce and communication between markets) as well as time limits (permanence of needs, durability and cost of preservation of commodities, periodicity of the market, the rate of interest, the development of speculation, the weight of political restrictions to intertemporal transfers of the commodity) (Menger [1871] 1976, pp. 246-247). Agents thus progressively learn to select increasingly marketable goods and proceeds to indirect exchange, although it does not permit immediate satisfaction of their needs:
"The economic interest of the economic individuals, therefore, with increased knowledge of their individual interests, without agreement, without legislation compulsion, even without any consideration of public interest, leads them to turn over there wares for more marketable ones, even if they do not need the latter for their immediate consumer needs" (Menger [1883 (Menger [ ] 1963 This positive feedback 12 process eventually singles out one commodity, a commodity that becomes money. This selection process however is not the result of purposefully thinking about the advantages of commonly understood or used money.
Market participants successfully experience smoother ways of trading for the sake of personal goals and, thus, are prone to carry on. In this case, the use of money by market participants is a spontaneous outcome of the market process. In other words, they do not invent money, nor are they able to know beforehand the superior properties of money in exchange, since it is an unintended result of their self-oriented activities. But it is also the use of prior or ex ante knowledge that helps people find better ways of carrying out transactions. As Menger explains in his 1892 paper on money , "the willing acceptance of the medium of exchange presupposes already a knowledge of these interests on the part of those economic subjects who are expected to accept in exchange for their wares a commodity which in and by itself is perhaps entirely useless to them" (Menger [1892] , p. 261).
As such, Menger's explanation is not satisfactory and involves some kind of circular reasoning: the question arises as to where this prior knowledge comes from since it is at the same time the result of a selection process. Menger's answer to this question comes as follows: "this knowledge never arises in every part of a nation at the same time. It is only in the first instance a limited number of economic subjects who will recognize the advantage in such a procedure, an advantage which, in itself, is independent of the general recognition of a commodity as a medium of exchange (…)" (ibid p. 261).
To sum up, the process of selection consists in four mechanisms.
First, it is based on an asymmetry of knowledge between two classes of agents:
'leaders' that are more able to see the advantages of indirect exchanges because they possess a better knowledge concerning the saleableness of specific commodities: they are referred to by Menger as "the most effective" and the "more intelligent bargainers" (Menger 1892, p. 254) ; and 'followers', who imitate them and who progressively become aware that through the use of these specific goods become, they can proceed "to
[their] end much more quickly, more economically and with a greatly probability of success" (Menger [1871] 1976, p.258).
Second, it involves a process of learning by imitation: 'followers' indeed imitate leaders in their use of money. They want what their neighbours do possess because they observe that their neighbours perform better by using 'money' than they do themselves without it. As Menger explains, "(…) it is admitted, that there is no better method of enlightening anyone about his economic interests than that he perceive the economic success of those who use the right means to secure their own" (Menger 1892, p. 247) The kind of imitation involved here is essentially of the informational type 13 since 'follower' imitates the 'leaders' because they are supposed to have a better knowledge of the properties of money in exchange and perform better.
Third, the selection process is depicted as a self-organizing procedure. As already emphasized, Menger only reluctantly admits the intrusion of external or legal compulsion in the process of emergence of money. In his 1892 article, he makes clear that "money has not been generated by law. In its origin it is a social, and not a state institution." He only admits that "by state recognition and state regulation this social institution of money has been perfected and adjusted to the manifold and varying needs of evolving commerce (…)" (Menger 1892, p. 255 With respect to the problem of knowledge, Menger appreciates the role of non articulable, unconscious knowledge when the use of money becomes ever more widespread, though never using the term of tacit knowledge. Rather, he implicitly refers to some social or collective knowledge that is embodied in social organic institutions 14 .
In other words, under civilization, the individual benefits from more knowledge than he is aware of. This is at least one way to explain the fact that useful organic institutions cannot be conceived only as a result of deliberate actions 15 . In other terms, actors frequently do better than they know merely because they know better than they are aware of knowing. It is then likely that with the passing of time the use of money becomes so anchored within habits and customs of market participants that using it does not require any longer the knowledge of its inner qualities in exchange. At this moment, using money becomes completely collective tacit knowledge. Although this argument But it is in his last contribution, the Law of Power, that Wieser provides an overall analysis of society that emphasizes power -power play, the psychology of power -and the role of beliefs in the emergence and evolution of institutions. We will therefore concentrate on this piece of work of Wieser.
First, let us focus on some important methodological features and terminology of Wieser's overall theoretical approach that might be helpful for understanding his perspective on the problems of emergence and evolution of institutions. 146). For Wieser, there is no hope in those two kinds of monist explanations. He also criticizes "dualist explanations", arguing that they also confront us with problems and do not, therefore, constitute a satisfactory alternative. Wieser takes as an example of the dualist explanations the classical distinction between the subjective (use) and the objective (exchange) value of goods, supposedly able to reconcile respectively the "personal or individual influences" and "those influences which transcend the personal or individual". But without a suitable way for connecting those two elements, this approach cannot be accepted either. For Wieser, the manner classical economics connect the two dimensions is misleading because the "so-called objective exchange value does not by any means apply objectively to everybody". More precisely, on the demand size of the market of a particular good, the principle of the objective exchange value holds true "only for those who can pay the current price, i.e., for those for whom the acquisition of the good brings an increase in utility which at least offsets the decrease in utility brought about by the payment of the price". Symmetrically, on the supply side, the principle holds good "only for those to whom the attainable price brings an in increase in utility sufficient to compensate for the sacrifice which giving up possession of the goods involves" (ibid, p. 147). Wieser therefore concludes that "the objectively determined price gives only the proximate base and not the ultimate standard for valuation, for one and the same quantity if money means a quite different utility experience for the poor and for the rich person (…)" (ibid, p. 147, italics in the original). In other terms, it amounts to saying that the so-called objective exchange value is the subjective exchange value for market participants since those who participate in exchange are oriented towards the same objective base, i.e., the market price. But for those excluded from the market, the objective exchange value has no meaning since "its outcome is as subjectively determined as is the personal use value in each individual case" (ibid, p. 148). In fine, the contrast between objective exchange value and subjective use value is nothing more than a "contrast between a multitude of parallel subjective cases and the isolated case" (ibid, italics in the original).
From a terminological viewpoint, Wieser refers to "social institutions" as distinguished from "historical formations" with respect to their mode of emergence.
Social institutions are characterized by the fact that they "are created by governments or by other order powers for a deliberate purpose and following a deliberate plan" or "in the awareness of a task to be done", while 'historical formations' "grow up without the possibility of one's becoming aware of a specific creator" but rather as a "searching force" Wieser ([1926] 1983, p. 141-45).
At first sight, Wieser's distinction is reminiscent of Menger's distinction between organic and pragmatic institutions. By analogy, historical formations could be conceived as organic institutions since they are the result of unintended action while social institutions should be considered as pragmatic ones since they are the result of "intentions, opinions, and available instrumentalities of human social unions or their ruler" (Menger [1883 (Menger [ ] 1963 .
Nevertheless, this analogy does not hold any longer if one reminds that for Menger, the distinction between pragmatic and organic institutions follows directly from another distinction of a methodological nature: the distinction between two orientations of theoretical research, namely the "realistic-empirical" approach and the "exact science" 
146, italics in the original).
More precisely, Wieser's analysis of power is based on two distinctions: on the one hand, the distinction between masses and leaders; on the other hand, the distinction between internal and external power.
First, Wieser differentiates between leaders and masses more to put forward that their respective behaviours or rationality obey different laws or display a distinct psychology of power than to suggest an idea of intellectual superiority of leaders with respect to masses or to convey a pejorative meaning to the term 'mass'. In Wieser's own terms, being a leader "(…) means nothing but to be the first in matters of common concern [and] [t]he social function of a leader is to walk in front (…)" (Wieser [1926 (Wieser [ ] 1983 . However, the phenomenon of leadership is based on the existence of inequalities within a given population: it is governed by the "law of small numbers" based "on the independence of conduct and the capacity to adapt to the given circumstances" (ibid. p.
45). Moreover, in the case of true following, the psychology of masses also displays a process of internalization (or even true identification) of power:
"Internal power arouses in the masses the urge for ready emulation. In this connection the individual obeys not only his own instinct, but his behavior is also determined by the contact he has with the attitude of his environment and that of the masses in their entirety. The experience of power is intensified by the fact that the individual submitting to power thereby enhances the effective weight of internal power in society: he joins the ranks of the social rulers, albeit with a minimal share of power" (Wieser [1926 (Wieser [ ] 1983 This passage suggests a dynamics between masses and leaders that is more complex than the term 'following' suggests. In fact, as we shall develop, this dynamics cannot be described in terms of imitation only. In particular, it involves the interplay of 'internal power', which constitutes a critical factor of the dynamics between masses and leaders .
Second, Wieser defines internal power as distinguished from external power. He conceives "internal power" as being "impersonal and anonymous" (Wieser [1926] 1983, p. 3) while "external power" corresponds to the power that some persons or some groups exert on people with the help of "external" means such as "numerical superiority, arms or wealth" (ibid. p. 3). Internal power may be channelled by several means: science and knowledge for instance, through "historical education", contribute to the creation of the social interactions which support social internal power (ibid. p. 107), while arts rather falls in the category of external power and leaders, even if it is rooted in the populace (ibid. p. 113). But the power of knowledge, contrary to 'faith power', is not a direct power but needs many intermediaries within the ruling classes in order to reach masses. It is therefore associated with Wieser's first law of social growth:
the tendency toward increasing stratification (ibid. p. 26).
To a certain extent, the distinction between internal and external power again echoes the one between historical formations and social institutions. Internal power indeed refers to historical formations conceived as the result of unintended actions while external power can be associated with social institutions viewed as human devices designed with a specific task or purpose in mind. Similarly as in the case of the distinction between historical formations and social institutions, internal and external power can hardly be dealt with independently from each other 23 . As Wieser emphasizes, there must be some complementarity and consistency between internal and external power. Related to this issue, he criticizes Nietzsche and Spencer's too emphatic conception of the leader or the "great man" which is, according to him, out of touch with the reality of masses (ibid. p. 46):
ndispensable as is the performance of the leader in front for the achievements of society, no less so is the following by the masses. If the leader is viewed as the sower casting out the seed, the masses may be viewed as the ground which absorbs it" (Wiser [1926 (Wiser [ ] 1983 This quotation brings us back to the issue of methodological individualism and holism. As we have emphasized, Wieser is neither satisfied with monist approaches nor with dualist ones, as he understands them. So what is the suitable method to be applied?
Wieser's answer is not always clear and his argument easy to follow. As we have also stressed, when he describes the dynamics between masses and leaders, Wieser clearly has in mind something more than passive imitation or 'blind borrowing'. We could argue that the kind of following that he labels 'true following' has some common features with self-reference imitation, defined by Orléan as a kind of imitation occurring when agents imitate but, by so doing, create a social value or a convention that gather some momentum and gain some autonomy vis-à-vis individuals that initiated the dynamics. By the same token, the idea of "anonymous leadership" could also be interpreted as a sophisticated mechanism that involves more than mutual interaction between masses and leaders. For, as Wieser indicates, this kind of leadership is characterized by the fact that "the social success of small groups can be magnified to full-fledged social success if the new strength, which first was formed by the small group in its own interest, is removed from its control and placed at the disposal of the society as a whole" (ibid. p. 33) 24 .
The following arguments may indeed support this view.
First, Wieser refers to the notion of 'objective spirit' which he borrowed from Dilthey and Freyer, whose teaching was widespread in Germany. He argues that the existence of an 'objective spirit' plays an essential role in the articulation between individuals or masses and leaders and strengthens the coherence of social systems. More precisely, this 'objective spirit' relates to the commonly observed psychology of social human beings to infer from others and share some significations or values:
"Because we ourselves are moved by emotions, follow impulses, act purposeoriented, connect mental images, forge concepts, and because this structural coherence of minds, characteristic of our very nature, falls within the realm of our experience, we can imagine ourselves as partaking in the consequences of the acts of foreign human beings and can re-create what spiritual values they contain (…) What is foreign becomes a signpost which we are able to follow even when it does not guide us simply in a certain direction but leads us to a plenitude of heterogeneous realities: languages, literatures, states, architectural styles, churches, customs, arts, and systems of sciences" (Freyer, Theory of the objective Spirit, quoted by Wieser [1926] 1983: 147) This idea of 'objective spirit' can be interpreted as a means to articulate individual beliefs or values with collective ones in a manner that is more sophisticated that the one implied by mere imitation. More precisely, for Wieser, the objective spirit of a community is more than a signpost: it is "like a current to which we are glad to yield because we feel its supporting power and whose superior strength we possibly may not be able to escape at all even when we are terrified to discover that it will carry us toward the abyss" (ibid, p. 148). In other terms, the 'objective spirit' becomes an entity which has its own developmental mechanisms, such as inertia, self-preservation (ibid. p. 124) and destructive power. However, its autonomy vis-à-vis individuals "must not undermine our recognition that it is borne out of the spirit of the united individuals"
(ibid, p. 149).
The idea of 'objective spirit' can also be related to Wieser's notion of social egoism, which he already developed in Social Economics. For Wieser, social egoism is conceived as an intrinsic component of the psychology of human beings implying that "by reason of the social egoism a man is ready to fit into the social order which includes both submission and domination" (Wieser [1914 (Wieser [ ] 1927 (Wieser [ 1967 Third, Wieser refers to "the law of upward mobility of classes 25 ", which implies the existence of a tendency towards the congruence of beliefs between masses and leaders.
Indeed, at first, masses have no share in public power, but through social interactionthrough labor and art essentially, they may have an opportunity to further their personal achievements and therefore, to resist the pressure from the leaders and not completely succumbing to it. As far as the ruling leaders are concerned, they are themselves aware of their own interest in augmenting the vigor of the people to utilize it better, so that the more enlightened rulers have a strong affinity for the populace and begin sharing public power with it. As Wieser summarizes it:
"In the present epoch, the face of the earth is being technically transformed by the alertness of (…) both those in command and those in subordination positions. All these quietly evolving and ascending collective forces have in due time been transformed into social power or they will do so, acting as a resistance first but eventually also sharing leadership roles" (Wieser [1926 (Wieser [ ] 1983 All expectations" (Wieser [1914 (Wieser [ ] 1927 (Wieser [ 1967 . This suggests again an interpretation of Wieser's approach conception of the emergence of institutions in terms of conventions (or social norms) or in terms of the supervenience approach, as we already sketched out.
Such an interpretation is also consistent with Wieser's description of some of the characteristics of the social dynamics between leaders and masses. As we have shown, for Wieser, this dynamics is not only governed by purely economic interests but also includes some extra-economic sociological laws such as the law of power, the law of increasing social stratification, the law of upward mobility of classes or the role of success. The resulting effect of these mechanisms is all but determinist, even neither can it be considered as welfare improving. From this viewpoint, Wieser differentiates himself from Menger who implicitly assumes that organic institutions serve the common welfare. Additional arguments taken from Wieser's writings may be put forward in order to support this view.
First, Wieser makes reference to "inner rules" such as inertia effects or selfdestruction mechanisms that underlie the law of power, as the following quotation exemplifies:
"A social group, once it has been formed into a unit by the sacrificium voluntatis of its members, cannot easily be jolted by the sacrifices which it demands of them.
Once success has induced leaders and masses to go together, failure will not automatically induce separation in spite of the losses caused by it" (Wieser [1926] 1983: 26)
Those mechanisms belong to the psychology of power and constitute what Wieser refers as the 'supra-social' or 'anti-individual' or even 'anti-social' character of power, which stands "in complete reversal to the law of success" (Wieser [1926] 1983: 71).
They also contribute to explain the emergence of collective wholes or social entities that have acquired some autonomy vis-à-vis individuals. This 'holistic' feature does not however lead to neglect the role of individuals within social dynamics. Wieser's contribution is also very enlightening regarding institutional matters. In particular, it provides some foundations for an analysis of the dynamics of institutions based on interlocking groups of agents and conflicting interests rooted in power and social strata.
Concluding remarks
Menger and Wieser approaches to the problem of the emergence of institutions share some common features. On the one hand, they both see it as the "unintended social results of individual tendencies" (Menger [1927 (Menger [ ] 1967 . On the other hand, both authors introduce a distinction between leaders and followers or masses, which underlies a further distinction between innovative and imitative behaviours. However, for Wieser, those two kinds of behaviour may overlap, because they also are rooted and subject to the law of power. This original feature of Wieser also permits to provide an analysis not only of the emergence but also on the evolution of institutions. Furthermore, they both appreciate the role of knowledge in economic and social phenomena in general, and in the more particular case of the emergence of institutions. As we have shown, both explanations of the emergence of institutions involve the interplay of individual and collective knowledge (or beliefs). If they both attempt to analyse the phenomenon of economic or social institutions from the perspective of interactions between individuals, they however differentiate from one another as regards the dynamic process underlying those interactions. On one hand, Menger takes for granted the involuntary formation of shared knowledge about the validity of social institutions such as money.
On the other hand, Wieser favours an explanation whereby collective beliefs are more than shared knowledge since they do have some autonomy vis-à-vis individuals.
A we have stressed Wieser's emphasis on the psychology of masses and leaders lead him to consider the influence of compulsion forces, besides the forces of freedom or "natural controls", on the historical formations underpinning institutions, while they are discarded by Menger. This also explains why Wieser views historical development and social institutions as radically non deterministic, and possibly welfare damaging, while
Menger implicitly assumes, judging from his analysis of the emergence of money, that they are always welfare enhancing. To this extent, Menger's analysis is limited to the emergence of institutions, viewed as a 'discovery' process, while Wieser's is more focused on the dynamics of institutions, seen as a creative-destructive process.
10 From a methodological viewpoint, the case of the emergence of money or more generally of organic institutions comes under the case of the "exact orientation of economic research", while pragmatic institutions refer to the "empirical realist approach" (Menger [1883] 1963: 55-61) 11 Menger in fact constructed the German word Absatzfähigkeit to refer to the property of marketability by merging two words: Absatz meaning something like 'the possibility of sale' or 'to find a market for' and Fähigkeit meaning 'the capability' or 'the ability'.
12 in the sense that a more marketable good is more exchangeable and then becomes more marketable. 13 Referring to Orlean's typology of imitation (informational, self-reference and normative imitation).
14 One may refer here to some kind of knowledge creation following Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) . 15 The process of emergence of money can also depicted as a "stochastically stable strategy" (Young, 1988; see Garrouste 2003 110-111) . In other terms, the institution of money emerges partly as the result of chance, and partly as the consequence of the better knowing of some agents of the intrinsic properties of the commodity that is likely to be commonly accepted. 16 As Stigler (1941) puts it, Wieser's contribution on capital theory "occupies a position of indisputable importance in the history of economics" and he "presented one of the best theories of capital which had emerged" in his time (Stigler 1941, pp. 158, 177;  quoted by Endres 1991, p. 68 18 As indicated by Warren J. Samuels in his introduction to the 1983 English translation of Das Gesetz der Macht, as early as in Social Economics, power is seriously taken into account since it constitutes, together with the principle of utility, the "twin organizing principles" of Wieser's theoretical economic framework. This feature had not been unnoticed by Oskar Morgenstern, who wrote in his obituary to Wieser that Social Economics had been the "greatest systematic treatise that has been written by an Austrian in which the principle of marginal utility is analyzed in all its ramifications" (Morgenstern 1927, p. 671, quoted by Samuels in the introduction of the Law of Power, Wieser [1926] 1983, p. xv).
